But his stay at Centreville on the 19th and 20th, occasioned by the impossibility of concentrating sooner his loosely organized force of raw troops, had enabled him to ascertain the intricate and wooded character of the country which he would have to traverse if he attempted this movement to the south. He therefore decided to turn Beauregard's left, by making a *dtiww* to the northwest with his right wing, which, crossing Bull Run at the ford near Sudley Springs, where lie was well assured no opposition would be encountered, would zuarcL down the right bank of the stream until it should pass behind the stone bridge on the Warren ton turnpike, when it could be joined by the troops from the left hank, and the enemy's line then be assailed in flank by the united Federal forces.

Many tilings favored this scheme. The fact that the Confederates were obliged to station the bulk of their forces so UB to cover Manassas Junction, made it practically certain that Bull Him could be crossed near Sudley SpringB without opposition, and rendered it also altogether probable that the Federal turning-movement would escape observation until it was too late for Baauregard to bring up a sufficient force from the lower fords of the river to oppone it successfully. The junction of the Federal

centre to the right wing af ter the bridge nhould be reached, would be certain, if properly effected, to produce an inspiriting effect on the United States forces. The Confederate left wing would b<* of itself too weak to offer any sctrious nwHtanw to tho united Federal forces, while the diflnmlty of bringing up troopg from